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On the Composability of Statistically Secure
Random Oblivious Transfer
Rafael Dowsley, Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade, Anderson C. A. Nascimento
Abstract—We show that stand-alone statistically secure ran-
dom oblivious transfer protocols based on two-party stateless
primitives are statistically universally composable. I.e. they are
simulatable secure with an unlimited adversary, an unlimited
simulator and an unlimited environment machine. Our result
implies that several previous oblivious transfer protocols in
the literature which were proven secure under weaker, non-
composable definitions of security can actually be used in
arbitrary statistically secure applications without lowering the
security.
Index Terms—Random Oblivious Transfer, Unconditional Se-
curity, Universal Composability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) [1] is a primitive of central impor-
tance in modern cryptography and implies secure computa-
tion [2], [3]. Several flavors of OT were proposed, but they
are all equivalent [4]. In this work we focus on the so-called
one-out-of-two random oblivious transfer. This is a two-party
primitive in which a sender (Alice) gets two uniformly random
bits b0, b1 and a receiver (Bob) gets a uniformly random choice
bit c and bc. Bob remains ignorant about bc. On the other hand,
Alice cannot learn the choice bit c.
A very large number of OT protocols are known in the
stand-alone setting, based on various assumptions (both com-
putational and physical), but this notion does not guarantee
security when multiple copies of the protocol are executed,
or when the OT protocols are used as building blocks within
other protocols. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, as
the major utility of OT is in the modular designing of larger
protocols. Following the simulation paradigm used in [5]
to define the seminal notion of zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge, many simulation-based definitions of security for
multi-party protocols were proposed (e.g. [2], [6]) and they
guarantee that the protocols are sequentially composable [7],
however this paradigm of security does not guarantee general
composability of the protocols. UC-security [8] emerges as a
very desirable notion of security for OT since it guarantees that
the security of the protocol holds even when the OT scheme
is concurrently composed with an arbitrary set of protocols.
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UC-security is a very powerful notion of security that allows
to fully enjoy the nice properties of OT within other protocols.
Some questions about the equivalence of stand-alone and
composable security notions in the case of statistically secure
protocols were studied [9], [10]. In general, these security
notions are not equivalent [10]. Therefore, it is an interesting
question to study if there are restricted scenarios where this
equivalence holds.
Our Results: In this paper we show that random OT proto-
cols that are based on certain stateless two-party functionalities
and that match a certain list of information-theoretical security
properties are not only secure in a simulation-based way,
but are actually UC-secure. Note that Random OT can be
straightforwardly used to obtain OT for arbitrary inputs in a
composable way [11]. Note also that most OT protocols based
on two-party stateless functionalities already internally run a
random OT protocol and then use derandomization techniques
to obtain OT for arbitrary inputs. We think that this approach
is interesting because, in this scenario, a protocol designer can
worry only about meeting the list-based security notion and the
protocol inherits the UC-security. The setting studied in this
paper covers the case of statistically secure protocols based on
noisy channels, cryptogates and pre-distributed correlated data.
As a consequence of our result, several previously proposed
protocol implementing oblivious transfer that were proven
secure in weaker models automatically have their security
upgraded to a simulation-based, composable one for free [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22],
[23], [24], [25].
A. Related Work
OT can be constructed based both on generic computa-
tional assumptions such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor
permutations [26], [27] and on the computational hardness
of many specific problems such as factoring [1], Diffie-
Hellman [28], [29], LWE [30], variants of LPN [31] and
McEliece assumptions [32], [33]. However, the focus of this
work is on statistically secure OT. When aiming for statistical
security, OT can be based on noisy channels [12], [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], cryptogates [21], [22], pre-
distributed correlated data [11], [23], [17], the bounded storage
model [34], [35], [36], [37] and on hardware tokens [24], [25].
Canetti and Fischlin [38] showed that OT cannot be UC-
realized in the plain model, so additional setup assumptions are
required. UC-secure OT protocols were initially constructed
in the common reference string (CRS) model [39], [40],
[30]. In the CRS model there exists an honestly generated
2random string that is available to the parties (the simulator can
generate its own string as long as it looks indistinguishable
from the honestly generated one). In the public key infras-
tructure model, Damga˚rd and Nielsen [41] proposed an OT
protocol that is UC-secure against adaptive adversaries under
the assumption that threshold homomorphic encryption exists.
Katz [42] proved that two-party and multi-party computation
are possible assuming a tamper-proof hardware.
The question about the equivalence of stand-alone and com-
posable security definitions for statistically secure protocols
has been previously addressed in [9], [10], where it was proven
that the equivalence does not hold in general. In [43] it was
proven that perfectly secure OT protocols according to a list
of properties are sequentially composable, this result being
extended to statistical security in [44].
It was shown that for statistically secure commitment
schemes based on two-party stateless primitives stand-alone
security implies UC-security [45]. While this result implies
the possibility of building UC-secure OT protocols based on
these commitment protocols, this is not the most efficient way
of obtaining OT and it does not prove any additional security
property about the existing OT protocols.
Even if the resources available to the parties to implement
OT are asymmetric, Wolf and Wullschleger [46] showed a very
simple way to reverse the OT’s direction (indeed all complete
two-party functionalities are reversible as proved recently by
Khurana et al. [47]).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Domains of random variables will be denoted by calli-
graphic letters, the random variables by upper case letters
and the realizations by lower case letters. For a random
variables X over X and Y over Y , PX : X → [0, 1] with∑
x∈X PX(x) = 1 denotes the probability distribution of X ,
PX(x) :=
∑
y∈Y PXY (x, y) the marginal probability distri-
bution and PX|Y (x|y) := PXY (x, y)/PY (y) the conditional
probability distribution if PY (y) 6= 0. The statistical distance
δ(PX , PY ) between PX and PY with alphabet X is given by
δ(PX , PY ) = max
S⊆X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈S
PX(x) − PY (x)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We say PX and PY are ε-close if δ(PX , PY ) ≤ ε. Following
Cre´peau and Wullschleger [44], let the statistical information
of X and Y given Z be defined as
IS(X ;Y |Z) = δ(PXY Z , PZPX|ZPY |Z).
B. The UC Framework
Here we briefly review the main concepts of the UC
framework, for more details please refer to the original work
of Canetti [8]. In the UC framework, the security of a protocol
to carry out a certain task is ensured in three phases:
1) One formalizes the framework, i.e., the process of ex-
ecuting a protocol in the presence of an adversary and
an environment machine.
2) One formalizes an ideal protocol for carrying out the
task in an ideal protocol using a “trusted party”. In the
ideal protocol the trusted party captures the requirements
of the desired task and the parties do not communicate
among themselves.
3) One proves that the real protocol emulates the ideal
protocol, i.e., for every adversary in the real model there
exists an ideal adversary (also known as the simulator)
in the ideal model such that no environment machine
can distinguish if it is interacting with the real or the
ideal world.
The environment in the UC framework represents all activity
external to the running protocol, so it provides inputs to the
parties running the protocol and receives the outputs that
the parties generate during the execution of the protocol. As
stated above the environment also tries to distinguish between
attacks on real executions of the protocol and simulated
attacks against the ideal functionality. If no environment can
distinguish the two situations, the real protocol emulates the
ideal functionality. Proving that a protocol is secure in the UC
framework provides the following benefits:
1) The ideal functionality describes intuitively the desired
properties of the protocol.
2) The protocols are secure under composition.
3) The security is retained when the protocol is used as
a sub-protocol to replace an ideal functionality that it
emulates.
a) The ideal world: An ideal functionality F represents
the desired properties of a given task. Conceptually, F is
treated as a local subroutine by the several parties that use
it, and so the communication between the parties and F
is supposedly secure (i.e., messages are sent by input and
output tapes). The ideal protocol also involves a simulator S,
an environment Z on input z and a set of dummy parties
that interacts as defined below. Whenever a dummy party
is activated with input x, it writes x onto the input tape of
F . Whenever the dummy party is activated with value x on
its subroutine output tape, it writes x on subroutine output
tape of Z . The simulator S has no access to the contents of
messages sent between dummy parties and F , and it should
send corruption messages directly to F , who is responsible
for determining the effects of corrupting any dummy party.
The ideal functionality receives messages from the dummy
parties by reading its input tape and sends messages to them
by writing to their subroutine output tape. In the ideal protocol
there is no communication among the parties. The environment
Z can set the inputs to the parties and read their outputs, but
cannot see the communication with the ideal functionality.
b) The real world: In the real world, the protocol π is
executed by parties P1, . . . ,Pn with some adversary A and an
environment machine Z with input z. Z can set the inputs for
the parties and see their outputs, but not the communication
among the parties. The parties can invoke subroutines, pass
inputs to them and receive outputs from them. They can also
write messages on the incoming communication tape of the
adversary. These messages may specify the identity of the
final destination of the message. A can send messages to any
3Functionality FROT
FROT interacts with Alice and Bob.
Alice’s Check-in: Upon receiving (DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . )
from Alice, if Alice is honest sample uniformly random
b0, b1 ∈ {0, 1}; otherwise set the bits b0, b1 as specified
in Alice’s message. Record (sid, b0, b1) and ignore future
(DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . ) from Alice.
Bob’s Check-in: Upon receiving (DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . )
from Bob, if Bob is honest sample a uniformly random
c ∈ {0, 1}; otherwise set the bit c as specified in Bob’s
message. Record (sid, c) and ignore future (DISTRIBUTE,
sid, . . . ) from Bob.
Distribution: Upon having recorded values b0, b1 and c
for some sid, send (OUTPUT, sid) to S. Upon an answer
(OUTPUT, sid) from S, deliver (OUTPUT, b0, b1) to Alice
and (OUTPUT, c, bc) to Bob.
Fig. 1. The one-out-of-two bit random oblivious transfer functionality.
party (A delivers the message). In addition, they may use the
ideal functionalities that are provided to the real protocol.
A can communicate with Z and the ideal functionalities
that are provided to the real protocol. A also controls the
corrupt parties (the environment always knows which parties
are corrupted).
c) The adversarial model: The network is asynchronous
without guaranteed delivery of messages. The communication
is public, but authenticated (i.e., the adversary cannot modify
the messages). The adversary is active in its control over
corrupted parties. Any number of parties can be corrupted.
Finally, the adversary, the environment and the simulator
are allowed unbounded complexity. This assumption on the
computational power of the simulator somehow weakens our
result as the composition theorem cannot be applied several
times if the real adversary were restricted to polynomial time,
because the “is at least as secure as” relation cannot be proven
to be transitive anymore. However, arbitrary composition is
allowed when considering statistically secure protocols and
this situation is common in the literature when proving general
results on the composability of statistically secure protocols
[10], [9], [44], [43].
d) Realizing an ideal functionality: A protocol π statis-
tically UC-realizes an ideal functionality F if for any real-
life adversary A there exists a simulator S such that no
environment Z , on any input z, can tell with non-negligible
probability whether it is interacting with A and parties running
π in the real-life process, or it is interacting with S and
F in the ideal protocol. This means that, from the point of
view of the environment, running protocol π is statistically
indistinguishable from the ideal world with F .
Functionality FPV,W |X,Y
FPV,W |X,Y interacts with Alice and Bob and is parametrized
by the conditional probability distribution PV,W |X,Y .
Alice’s Input: Upon receiving (INPUT, sid, x) from Alice, if
x ∈ X then record (sid, x). Ignore future messages (INPUT,
sid, . . . ) from Alice.
Bob’s Input: Upon receiving (INPUT, sid, y) from Bob, if
y ∈ Y then record (sid, y). Ignore future messages (INPUT,
sid, . . . ) from Bob.
Output: Upon obtained valid inputs from Alice and Bob
for some sid, pick v, w according to PV,W |X,Y and output
(OUTPUT, sid, v) to Alice and (OUTPUT, sid, w) to Bob.
Fig. 2. The functionality that given valid inputs, samples outputs according
to the conditional probability distribution and delivers the outputs to Alice
and Bob.
e) The Oblivious Transfer Functionality: We present in
Figure 1 the one-out-of-two bit random oblivious transfer
functionality FROT. The sender will be denote by Alice and
the receiver by Bob.
C. Setup Assumption
In this work we consider the scenario in which Alice and
Bob have access to the functionality FPV,W |X,Y that given
inputs x ∈ X from Alice and y ∈ Y from Bob samples
the outputs v ∈ V and w ∈ W according to the conditional
probability distribution PV,W |X,Y , and gives the outputs v and
w to Alice and Bob, respectively. The functionality FPV,W |X,Y
is described in Figure 2. Note that this functionality captures
setup assumptions that are commonly used for obtaining
statistically secure OT protocols, such as the existence of a
stateless noisy channel between the parties, cryptogates and
pre-distributed correlated data.
III. RANDOM OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER BASED ON
STATISTICALLY SECURE TWO PARTY STATELESS
FUNCTIONALITIES
In this section we define a stand-alone security model for
random OT protocols that achieve statistical security by using
FPV,W |X,Y as a setup assumption. Alice and Bob have two
resources available between them:
• a bidirectional authenticated noiseless channel denoted as
FAUTH and
• the functionality FPV,W |X,Y .
We model the probabilistic choices of Alice by a random
variable coinsAlice and those of Bob by a random variable
coinsBob, so that we can use deterministic functions in the
protocol. As usual, we assume that the noiseless messages
exchanged by the players and their personal randomness are
taken from {0, 1}∗.
4a) Protocol π: Alice and Bob interact and in the end
of the execution Alice gets (b0, b1) and Bob gets (c, bc), for
b0, b1, c ∈ {0, 1} picked uniformly at random. The security
parameter is n, and determines how many times the parties can
use the functionality FPV,W |X,Y : in the i-th round Alice and
Bob input symbols xi and yi to the functionality FPV,W |X,Y ,
which generates the outputs vi and wi according to PV,W |X,Y
and delivers them to Alice and Bob, respectively. Let xi, yi, vi
and wi denote the vectors of these variables until i-th round.
The parties can use FAUTH at any moment. Let trans denote
all the noiseless messages exchanged between the players.
We call the view of Bob all the data in his possession,
i.e. yn, wn, c, coinsBob and trans, and denote it by viewBob.
viewAlice is defined similarly. We denote the output of the
(possibly malicious) parties Alice and Bob by outputAlice and
outputBob, respectively. The stand-alone definition of security
that is henceforth considered in this paper follows the lines
of Cre´peau and Wullschleger [44]. The protocol is said to be
secure if there exists an ǫ that is a negligible function of the
security parameter n and is such that the following properties
are satisfied:
b) Correctness: If both parties are honest, then
outputAlice = (b0, b1) and outputBob = (c, d) for d ∈ {0, 1}
and uniformly random b0, b1, c ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally,
Pr[D = BC ] ≥ 1− ǫ.
c) Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then
outputAlice = (b0, b1) for uniformly random b0, b1 ∈ {0, 1}
and there exists a random variable C such that
IS(B0, B1;C) ≤ ǫ
and
IS(B0, B1; outputBob|C,BC) ≤ ǫ.
d) Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then outputBob =
(c, d) for d ∈ {0, 1} and uniformly random c ∈ {0, 1}; and
IS(C; outputAlice) ≤ ǫ.
IV. UC-SECURITY IMPLICATION
In this section we address the question of whether random
OT protocols that are secure according to the definitions of
Section III also enjoy statistical UC-security. We will show that
this is indeed the case. Intuitively this follows from the fact
that the security in those protocols is based on the correlated
randomness that is provided by the functionality FPV,W |X,Y
to Alice and Bob. Since in the ideal world the simulator
controls FPV,W |X,Y , it can leverage this knowledge in order
to extract the outputs of the corrupted parties and forward
them to the random oblivious transfer functionality FROT, thus
allowing the ideal execution to be indistinguishable from the
real execution from the environment’s point of view. First we
prove some lemmas that will be used later on to prove the
main result of this work.
We first show that in any random OT protocol that is stand-
alone secure, if Bob is honest, then given Alice’s input to and
output from the functionality FPV,W |X,Y and all the noiseless
communication exchanged by Alice and Bob through FAUTH
it is possible to extract both outputs that Bob would get with
c = 0 and c = 1 in the random OT protocol.
Lemma 4.1: Let π be a stand-alone secure random OT
protocol and let Bob be honest. Given Alice’s input to and
output from FPV,W |X,Y and all the noiseless communication
exchanged by Alice and Bob through FAUTH during the
execution of π, with overwhelming probability it is possible
to extract the output that Bob would get both in the case that
c = 0 and c = 1.
Proof: Lets consider an execution of the protocol π in
which Bob has random coins coinsBob and gets outputBob =
(c, d) for d ∈ {0, 1} and uniformly random c ∈ {0, 1}
(as the protocol is stand-alone secure). Denote by m the
set of messages exchanged between Alice and FPV,W |X,Y
concatenated with the noiseless messages between Bob and
Alice. We claim that there should exist coinsBob 6= coinsBob so
that for the samem, if Bob executed the protocol with coinsBob
he should have been able with overwhelming probability to get
outputBob = (c, d) with c 6= c and d ∈ {0, 1}. If that were not
the case, Alice would know that Bob is unable to obtain a valid
output d when the choice bit is c, thus gaining knowledge on
the choice bit and breaking the protocol security. Given that
IS(outputAlice;C) ≤ ǫ,
we get
δ(PoutputAliceC , PoutputAlicePC) ≤ ǫ,
and so there are events E1 and E2 such that
Pr[E1] = Pr[E2] = 1− ǫ and
PoutputAliceC|E1 = PoutputAlice|E2PC|E2 .
Therefore if E1 and E2 happen, then outputAlice does not
provide information about C and coinsBob should exist. Thus,
given m we are left with an extraction procedure. One just
computes coinsBob and coinsBob that for this m produce
outputs outputBob and outputBob, respectively, and simulates
the protocol execution for each specified Bob’s randomness.
We now prove that given access to the messages that Bob
exchanges with Alice and FPV,W |X,Y , there is a point in the
protocol execution in which it is possible to extract the choice
bit c and still equivocate b0, b1 to any value, i.e., it is possible
to find an Alice’ view that is compatible with the current view
of Bob and the new values of b0 and b1.
Lemma 4.2: Let π be a stand-alone secure random OT
protocol and let Alice be honest. Given access to all messages
that Bob’s exchanges with FPV,W |X,Y and all the noiseless
communication exchanged by Alice and Bob through FAUTH
during the execution of π, with overwhelming probability it
is possible to extract the choice bit c at some point of the
execution of the protocol π. Additionally at this point it is
still possible to change b0 and b1 to any desired values.
Proof: We first prove that there is a point in the protocol
execution where we can extract the choice bit given the
messages that Bob exchanged with Alice and the functionality
FPV,W |X,Y . Let m denote these messages in a given protocol
execution. Let M(0) denote the set of messages that allow
Bob to obtain the bit b0 with overwhelming probability (the
5probability taken over coinsAlice, coinsBob and the randomness
of FPV,W |X,Y ). And letM(1) be defined similarly for b1. From
the stand-alone security for Alice we have that
IS(B0, B1;C) ≤ ǫ
and
IS(B0, B1; outputBob|C,BC) ≤ ǫ,
and so we get that m with overwhelming probability (over
coinsAlice and the randomness of FPV,W |X,Y ) cannot be in both
M(0) andM(1), since this fact would imply that the resulting
protocol would be insecure for Alice. This fact gives us a
procedure for obtaining the choice bit c given m. We just
check if m is in M(0) or M(1).
We now turn to the equivocation property. From the previous
reasoning, we know that there should exist a point in the
protocol where Bob sends a message to Alice that fixes the
choice bit (i.e. the choice bit can be extracted from his
messages from/to Alice and FPV,W |X,Y ). Let i be the index of
such message. Suppose the i-th message is the very last one
in the protocol. Then Bob has all the information necessary
to compute his output even before sending the i-th message.
As the choice bit is only fixed in the next message, Bob
should be able to compute both b0 and b1, breaking Alice’s
security. Thus, the i-th message should not be the last one.
The same reasoning implies that from Bob’s point of view,
none of Alice’s outputs b0 and b1 can be fixed before the i-th
message: (1) if both b0 and b1 are fixed from Bob’s point of
view before the i-th message, then he could obtain both b0
and b1 and break the stand-alone security; (2) if only bi is
fixed, then Bob can still change his choice to c = 1 − i and
obtain both b0 and b1, thus breaking the stand-alone security.
Therefore, we should have that when the i-th message is sent
by Bob, Alice’s outputs b0 and b1 are still equivocable.
We now use two lemmas to prove our main result:
Theorem 4.3: Any stand-alone statistically secure protocol
π of random oblivious transfer based on FAUTH and FPV,W |X,Y
UC-realizes FROT.
Proof: We construct the simulator S as follows. S runs
a simulated copy of A in a black-box way, plays the role
of the ideal functionality FPV,W |X,Y and simulates a copy of
the hybrid interaction of π for the simulated adversary A. In
addition, S forwards the messages between Z and A. Below
we describe the procedures of the simulator in each occasion:
Only Alice is corrupted: S samples the randomness
coinsBob of the simulated Bob and proceeds with the
simulated execution of the protocol π by producing his
noiseless messages as well as his inputs yi ∈ Y to
FPV,W |X,Y . Additionally, once the inputs xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y
to FPV,W |X,Y are fixed, S simulates the outputs of the
functionality FPV,W |X,Y and sends vi to A. As S plays the
role of FPV,W |X,Y , when the execution is done, S extracts the
output bits b0, b1 of the corrupted Alice using the result of
lemma 4.1 and forwards b0, b1 to FROT. S then allows FROT
to deliver the output.
Only Bob is corrupted: S samples the randomness
coinsAlice of the simulated Alice and proceeds with the
simulated execution of the protocol π by producing her
noiseless messages as well as her inputs xi ∈ X to
FPV,W |X,Y . Additionally, once the inputs xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y
to FPV,W |X,Y are fixed, S simulates the outputs of the
functionality FPV,W |X,Y and sends wi to A. Then using
the result of lemma 4.2, S extracts the choice bit c of the
corrupted Bob, inputs c to FROT, receives bc and finishes the
simulated protocol execution in such way that the received
bit in the hybrid interaction b′c is equal to the received bit in
the ideal protocol bc with overwhelming probability.
Neither party is corrupted: S samples the randomness
coinsAlice and coinsBob and proceeds with the simulated
execution of the protocol π by simulating the noiseless
messages as well as the inputs/outputs of FPV,W |X,Y , and
reveals the noiseless messages to A. If the simulated Bob
would output b′c′ in the hybrid interaction, then S allows
FROT to output the bit bc.
Both parties are corrupted: S just simulates FPV,W |X,Y .
We analyze below the probabilities of the events that can
result in different views for the environment Z between the
real world execution with the protocol π and the adversary A,
and the ideal world execution with functionality FROT and the
simulator S:
• When only Alice is corrupted, Z’s view in the real and
ideal worlds are equal if: (1) S succeeds to extract both
of Alice’s outputs bits b0, b1 to forward to FROT; (2) A
does not learn the choice bit c′ in the simulated protocol
execution. By lemma 4.1, the extraction works with
overwhelming probability. By the stand-alone security,
with overwhelming probability A does not learn c′.
• When only Bob is corrupted, Z’s view in the real and
ideal worlds are equal if: (1) S succeeds to extract
the bit c and finish the protocol in such way that the
received bit b′c in the simulated protocol execution is
equal to bc; (2) A cannot learn b
′
c in the simulated
protocol execution. By lemma 4.2, the first condition is
satisfied with overwhelming probability. By the stand-
alone security, with overwhelming probability A cannot
learn b′c
• When neither party is corrupted, S’s procedures statisti-
cally emulate the hybrid execution for the adversary A,
as A cannot learn b′0, b
′
1, c
′ from the noiseless messages
alone.
• When both parties are corrupted, S’s procedures perfectly
emulate the hybrid execution for the adversary A.
We conclude that since all events that can result in different
views have negligible probabilities, the protocol π UC-realizes
FROT.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we prove that random oblivious transfer
protocols based on two-party stateless functionalities matching
a list of security properties are universally composable when
unbounded simulators are allowed. As previously commented,
6this assumption on the simulator gives us secure universal
composability with other statistically secure protocols. The
restriction to random oblivious transfer protocols is not restric-
tive (since random OT can be used to obtain OT for arbitrary
inputs [11], proving the composability of such reduction is
straightforward). And most of the OT protocols based on two-
party stateless functionalities are in fact designed to initially
run an internal random OT protocol and then derandomize the
values. In this case the universally composability implication
can be applied directly to the inner random OT protocol.
However, it is an interesting problem to generalize the results
presented here to arbitrary OT. Our result immediately imply
that several previously proposed OT protocols can have their
security upgraded for free [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [11], [23], [24], [25].
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